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Introduction
The extent to which observed working hours reflect individual decisions may be important for the reliability of econometric mo~els of labour supply behaviour. Indeed, there has been an increasing awareness of the need to allow for constraints in empirical labour supply models see, among others, Ham (1982 Ham ( , 1986 and Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1989) . Where there are also a significant number of individuals who are observed not to participate in the labour market, as is the case for the sample of married women used in this study, a careful treatment of the relationship between desired hours of work and non-participation would seem critical. In particular it is natural to draw a distinction between those individuals who are out of work but actively seeking employment from those who are not involved in active job search (see for example Flinn and Heckman, 1983) . The hours of work of married women in France seem potentially sensitive to these issues as there appears significant bunching of-hours at particular points which do not appear to necessarily reflect labour supply preferences. The studies of Bourguignon and Magnac (1990) , Blundell and Laisney (1988) and Dagsvik et al. (1988) document these issues while dealing with taxes. Moreover, the latter two studies, using the same subsample of the INSEE survey Budgets des Familles 1979, but rather different behavioural models, find high uncompensated wage elasticities which may be considered unrealistic on a priori grounds. Using the same survey as an illustration, this paper examines the robustness of these results to alternative interpretations of observed hours information. 'The next two subsections present the relevant basic ideas and the alternative interpretations of hours information studied here. Section 2 briefly discusses the model specification and the data, and section 3 presents and interprets the estimation results. Section 4 gives the results of the tests. We conclude with directions for future work. Appendix A gives descriptive statistics and some preliminary estimation results. Details on the algebra of the tests are collected in Appendix B.
A Modelling Framework
We start from an economic model for desired hours:
where w denotes the net marginal wage rate, x denotes net full income and z a vector of household characteristics. The randomness of preferences is assumed to result in the additive error term E • By contrast, the data set we have contains no information on desired hours, but only information on reported normal hours of work and, for those reporting zero hours, a distinction is drawn between the individuals presently seeking work (henceforth seekers) and the others.
Two distinct sets of questions arise: (i) How should we treat the seekers? As participants? (This is closest to the ILO definition of participation). As nonparticipants? (This is implicitly assumed in studies where job search information is either not available or ignored). Should they simply be excluded? (This may cause selection bias). (ii) Are the reported normal hours of work for each individual on her supply curve (desired hours)? If not, how are they to be related to desired hours of work? Both sets of questions involve a discussion of demand side conditions and their variation over time. Failure to address them satisfactorily may result in the misspecification of the preference structure.
In the following analysis, we treat the seekers as desiring to supply a positive, but unspecified, number of hours. The possibility for some non seeking nonparticipants to be in fact discouraged workers (see Blundell, Ham and Meghir, 1990) will not be considered. This is equivalent to assuming tb assuming negligible search costs. We retain the framework introduced by Blundell and Laisney (1988) of grouping the hours information, and place particular emphasis on the implications of different degrees of grouping. The models considered range from an extended Probit model in which the standard Probit model is extended to account for job-seekers among those not in employment. In this specification participation information alone is utilised. At the other extreme is the extended Tobit model where reported hours are assumed to coincide with desired hours. The grouping model lies in this range and assumes hours of work provide only limited information on desired hours. In fact, given that hours are recorded as integers, there remains some degree of grouping even in the Tobit model, which must be considered as an approximation. However, a look at the distribution of reported hours in our sample, pictured in Figure A1 , shows that the Tobit specification does not seem a priori attractive.
Sample Likelihoods under Different Hours Information
We partition the hours range in intervals 1 k • k = O •..• K and the set of individuals in index sets
(2) \ where hi denotes the hours reported by individual i . The set S of seekers is a subset of J 0 and our assumptions are as follows:
(3)
where an overbar indicates the complement.
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The sequence of models we consider are distinguished by the increasing amount of information on hours of work that is exploited in the sample likelihood. The simplest model, termed Extended Probit, has the following sample likelihood:
where E denotes the event of finding a job available when searching. Assuming independence between this event and h' conditional on the observed regressors, the probabilities P [i E E J and 1 -PI i E E J will factor out. Indeed, given the absence of parameter restrictions, maximization of (4) will be equivalent to maximization of:
Although one could advance a number of reasons casting doubt on the independence assumption, it was tested in the study of Blundell et al. (1987) and was not rejected.
Considering a grouping of hours in K groups leads to the Extended Grouped specification which has the sample likelihood:
Finally, taking reported hours as desired hours while taking account of the seekers results in the Extended Tobit model with sample likelihood: [h;EloJnp[h;E/oJn.f(h;) ,
where .f denotes the density of desired hours implied by (1).
Diagnostic Tests
The first set of diagnostics we consider are versions of Lagrange Multiplier tests suggested by White (1982) , and are based on the theory of pseudo maximum likelihood. In the Monte-Carlo results reported in Lechner (1991) the corresponding quasi-Lagrange-multiplier (QLM) version was found to have superior small sample properties in comparison with the standard LM test. Furthermore, the estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix used is consistent in cases where the ML estimator of the vector of coefficients is consistent, yet not asymptotically efficient. This is important in the present situation since we use non-efficient two-step procedures in estimation. The specific formulas for the grouped, Probit and Tobit models used in this paper are obtained through slight modifications of those given by Chesher and Irish (1987) and are provided in Appendix B.
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To test for the appropriate degree of hours grouping we employ a sequence of Hausman-Wu tests in which the potential efficiency gains from an increase in the amount of information on hours used in estimation is compared with the likely inconsistency resulting from hours constraints. The idea of the tests conducted is that for two nested groupings, if the assumptions (3) are valid for both, the estimates obtained with the finer grouping will be more efficient than those obtained with the coarser one, whereas they will become inconsistent for the first one if (3) is valid for the second one only. Finally, we present results of misspecification tests based on the Heckman-Andrews principle (see Andrews, 1988a,b) , which is a generalisation ofthe classical Pearson X 2 statistic. This test seems to be particularly attractive in our context, since the necessary grouping of endogenous and exogenous variables is naturally suggested by the different models used.
Empirical Analy~is

The model specification
The general form of our labour supply model for hours of work h can be written
where w is the net real marginal wage and m • a measure of (real) virtual income that will be discussed below, is constructed using the budget identity m = ew h in which e is total expenditure (measured directly in the Budgets des Familles) and w is the marginal wage as in (7). Although we did not attempt to correct for the discrepancy between real expenditure and consumption due to infrequency of purchase (as in Kay et aI., 1984) , we do allow for measurement error and/or endogeneity of m during estimation by the use of instrumental variables (see Keen, 1986) .
The attraction of using (7) is twofold. First, it is a simple "three parameter" model but unlike the linear labour supply model it allows Slutsky consistency while permitting negative sloping labour supply behaviour (see Stern, 1986) . Second, using our definition of m as in (8) it is life-cycle consistent as defined in Blundell and Walker (1986) . A simple rearrangement of (7) generates the following Stone-Geary earnings equation.
with x the virtual full income given by x = e + w (T -h) = m + w T , where T is the total time available and a (w , p) = w (T -y) + d, where d represents the minimum expenditure on goods at prices p. The corresponding labour supply equation is:
w w (9) Note that d is identified from a simple participation Probit since it is computed as the ratio between the coefficients of 1/ wand m / wand ratios of coefficients are not affected by the lack of identification of the scale parameter in the Probit model. The budget line resulting from the French tax system is piecewise linear, with kinks at the ends of each of the tax brackets, at the points where the withdrawal of the means-tested child benefit begins and ends, and at the various ceilings for the social insurance contributions. However, for most women in the sample, visual inspection of the budget line reveals no striking deviation from linearity. See Appendix D. For more details on the way the French tax-benefit system is modelled here, see Dagsvik et al. (1988) and our 1988 study. Here the budget line is linearized around the observed point, using the budget identity as explained above. Since m can be suspected of endogeneity on several grounds, it has been instrumented.
As we shall see below, this model passes non-linearity checks, whereas, in spite of our apparently rudimenta7 treatment of the tax system, disregard of taxes leads to rejection of the linearity of the earnings equation implied by equation (8) (see Appendix C).
While we allow y and d to vary with demographics, for the purpose of this exercise we treat f?> as constant. Thus, two direct extensions of this work would consist in letting f?> vary (i) with demographics (ii) with 1n w (see Blundell and Meghir, 1986) . The latter has the advantage of allowing backward bending and forward sloping for a given m , which is not the case for (7) or (9). Note however that (9) does allow both positive and negative wage elasticities, varying directly with demographics through d. In particular, negative uncompensated wage elasticities are more likely to arise when m is small and consequently when hours are large. Simple separability tests are also available with specifi,cation (9) when estimating demand for goods equations (see Blundell, Laisney and Ruth, 1989 ). As we shall see, the results of diagnostics do not suggest a departure from the chosen functional form. The concavity of the cost function is ensured by the condition that m + w y > d , which says that the maximum resources should cover the minimum expenditure and guarantees that desired hours will remain below the maximum number of hours available for work y .
Data
Our sample consists of 3658 households. We exclude housing expenditure from total expenditure e since we may consider it to be fixed outside period specific labour supply and consumption choices. Regional unemployment is introduced in the wage equation instead of the tension indicator previously used (see BlundeB and Laisney, 1988 and Dagsvik et aI., 1988 for details). Indeed, in those earlier studies, we had chosen households facing the same tax parameters resulting in a smaBer sample of only 1928 households. For estimation purposes, this may create some identification problems, as pointed out by Moffitt (1988) , since both preferences and taxes depend on some demographics: using a sample with tax parameter variation may overcome that problem to some extent. Otherwise using the same selection rule, we have managed to almost double the sample size. Table Al in Appendix A gives the means of the variables relevant for equations (8) and (9) for five subsamples: the first three correspond to participants with positive hours falling in the three hours ranges used in estimation, and the last two correspond to seekers and non participants. The seekers represent 5.5% of the total sample (sampling weights have not been used in this study) and 11.4% of aB participants. The participation rate is .480 if seekers are considered as participants and .425 if they are considered as non-participants. Note that the characteristics of the seekers do not lie between those of participants and nonparticipants: on average the seekers are younger, have more children at ecole materneBe, are less likely to own their housing and have higher predicted marginal wage rates. Their education level pattern is closer to that of participants supplying long hours than to non-seekers. It would be exaggerated to infer from this that they are not really searching for work, but it might be more appropriate to view these women as new entrants having spent some time outside the labour market. They probably differ from the standard view of prime aged men who have recently been layed-off.
3 Estimation Results non participation: h < 1.5. (Hours are reported as integers on two digits, hence no individual will be observed on the boundary of an interval). The results for the latter two models are given in terms of scaled coefficients and precision for ease of comparison with the probit estimates. Strictly speaking, the shape of the budget constraint should enter the calculation of the probability for desired hours of being in any given range. However, the examples of budget constraints presented in Appendix D show that approximating the budget constraint with its linearization at observed hours will not lead to gross mistakes with the data set we use.
The Parameter Estimates
The specification presented is the result of a descending specification search operated with the Probit model, the argument being that this yields consistent estimates. The age regressors are self-explanatory. The children variables are counts except for the category "other children" which is split in three dummies. The category "small children" groups children too young for ecole maternelle, whether they are kept at home or elsewhere. The category "other children" groups children at primary and secondary school. _The education variables entering preferences are general education degrees, in contrast with those entering the wage equation (Table A2 ), which combine general and vocational degrees. The reference category consists of people who failed the lowest exam or did not take it and failed or dropped out at higher stages. This explains the signs in Table AZ. The results appear fairly similar across the three models. A number of coefficients on socio-demographic variables are significant. It is difficult to discuss the economic interpretation of those reduced form coefficients.
The structu;~l coefficients are given in Table 2 , where the first column contains values for the Probit model obtained by setting a = 33 . The models now appear to differ somewhat, especially as regards the effects of age and of the children variables. The maximum number of hours available for work has its maximum at age 25.5,29.2 and 28.8, respectively, for the three models. The maximum number of weekly hours available for work to a 40-years old woman without children is 38.12 in the extended grouped model, and 44.35 if she lives in a suburb. It becomes negative for a woman older than 56. In interpreting these figures it should be remembered that the normal error term added to equation (9) can be given the interpretation of 1 -f3 times a random term entering the parameter y. The latter will thus have a standard deviation of 43.9 for the extended grouped model. The effects of education on preferences, as captured by the chosen regressors, appear to be non-monotonous, with a maximum for lower secondary school. The children variables act as expected and it proved useful to break the linearity implied by a count for the category "other children". The minimum expenditures on goods are not well determined, except for the effect of being in the process of buying a house: this has a positive impact on minimum expenditures and thus on desired hours (see equation (9». Table 3 shows much lower elasticities than those obtained in the studies of Blundell and Laisney (1988) and Dagsvik et al. (1988) . The first thought was that this came from the use of a sample with tax parameter variation, but this does not seem to be the only reason since the same operation (including the change to regional unemployment rates) with the model of the second named study produced no significant change 4 . We also found elasticities to be fairly sensitive to the choice and specification of socio-demographic effects. The maximum absolute values of elasticities are obtained in the part-time group, as expected because of the presence of hours in the denominator. This is at variance with the results from some other country studies reported by Nakamura and Nakamura (1991) . Another interesting feature of these results is that we now have some individuals with negative uncompensated wage elasticities. Inspection shows that these are on average either older women or women with more small children or children at ecole maternelle. The concavity condition is never violated in the sample. Table 4 shows the results of diagnostic tests 6 . The first series of tests concerns non-linearity tests: we test separately and jointly against T11 2 , W 2 and In w missing in the earnings equation (8). The second series concerns heteroscedasticity: we test against a special form of heteroscedasticity, namely with the logarithm of variance linear in all non-constant model regressors. (We have deleted entries consistently above the 5% empirical significance level, including the models reported in Appendix C). The third series concerns non-normality: we test separately against skewness and kurtosis and jointly against both. Linearity is passed easily (except for the models with incomplete treatment of the tax system, see Appendix C: this is no surprise since one can expect a tradeoff between non-linearity in the budget restriction and non-linearity in the preferences). For the probit model, heteroscedasticity appears only through the dummy variable "education= end of secondary school". The similarity with Laisney et aI. (1991) on this point is striking. Since this questions consistency, we have estimated a model explicitly allowing for this type of heteroscedasticity. Although heterogeneity appears between the subsample defined by this dummy (which represents 6.8% of the total) and the rest of the sample, the coefficients for the latter are only slightly altered, suggesting that inconsistency is not a problem for most of the; sample. The normality check is passed easily by the probit model, (and this is confirmed by testing against an SNP alternative, see Gabler et aI., 1990) but non-normality, as reflected in QLM statistics, becomes a problem when more information on hours is used. This is a familiar phenomenon, which is documented in Monte-Carlo experiments by Blundell, Peters and Smith (1989) . There is yet another interpretation: since all these tests are consistent, they will reject the null of a valid grouping of hours which is maintained when testing for non-normality, in case the invalidity of the grouping leads to inconsistency of the estimator. This interpretation is also suggested by the Hausman tests reported below. Heteroscedasticity becomes also more stringent and the same comment applies. The Heckman-Andrews tests reported are based on clustering the endogenous variable according to participation (2 classes), and the exogenous variables according to (a) nothing (1 class), (b) predicted hours (4 classes corresponding to the groups used in the estimation of the extended grouped model), (c) predicted marginal wage rate (5 classes), (d) predicted virtual income (5 classes) and (e) "end of secondary school" (2 classes), and forming the corresponding cartesian products7. No rejection occurs for the Probit models, whereas the specification is constantly rejected when using hours information. The same interpretati~n as above can be drawn here. However, we should' also note that the small sample properties of these Heckman-Andrews tests have yet to be investigated.. Table 5 presents the results of Hausman tests for the overall validity of each alternative treatment of the hours information. The results are presented in matrix form where the intersection of line i and column j corresponds to the test of the validity of model j when model i is assumed correct. Each row is repeated three times, to take' account of problems with the failure of positive semidefiniteness of the difference between the covariance matrices, which are revealed by comparison of the standard errors reported in Table 1 . We drop the negative eigenvalues, which amounts to restricting attention to a subspace where positive semi-definiteness holds. In a further step we also investigate the effect of distrusting small positive eigenvalues, which is valid as well for the same reason. In this way we find that-the extended Tobit specification is mildly rejected when tested against the extended grouped, but that both are severely rejected when tested against the;probit. That is no real surprise given the previous discussion. Rather more surprising is the fact that the extended grouped specification is more severely rejected than the extended Tobit.
The Estimated Labour Supply Elasticities
Finally, in Table 6 we present an assessment of within sample predictive performance. Table 6(a) gives the sum of estimated probabilities for each cell using the estimates from each model specification. In the case of the .Probit the variance is set as in Table 2 . It is noticeable that the impact of using more hours information is to increase over-prediction of participation. Table 6(b) focuses on the participants and in particular on the ability of the models to replicate the observed hours distribution. The results are disappointing and confirm the impression from 6(a), that even conditional on participation the model predicts too many part-time workers. To some extent this may reflect the importance of fixed costs which suggest a bimodal distribution between non-participation and full-time. This would also go some way towards explaining the low forecast non-participation rate in 6(a). This paper has concerned the detailed examination of information over hours of work and job search in the estimation of labour supply models for married women in the French data set Budgets des FamilIes. Although normal hours of work for those women in employment are available, this information may not reflect desired hours of work. Moreover, for those not in employment but searching for work it would seem unreliable to assume their desired hours of work are non-positive. As a result we treat job seekers as participants and consider various degrees of grouping on hours of work. A discrete choice model which treats job seekers as participants and which acknowledges the full implications of the French tax and benefit system appears to produce most plausible results. Utilising information on hours in grouped form or in actual hours form appeared to add little to this specification and no model could explain satisfactorily the observed distribution of hours between part-time and full-time. However, relaxing information over the tax and benefit system appeared to result in inferior model ·estimates. Qur preferred model displayed significantly smaller wage elasticity estimates than those obtained in previous studies. Even there we found some indication of distributional misspecification, most especially with heteroscedasticity, but obtained some evidence that this may not affect consistency for the largest part of the sample. Clearly these results are heavily influenced by the lack of significant variation in observed hours. Nevertheless there does appear to be an important distinction between the participation and·hours decision (see also the results of Bourguignon and Magnac, 1990) . However, with the recent availability'of the 1985 data source, which is known to indicate an increase in the proportion of women working part-time, it may become possible to identify a more precise and separate process for hours of work conditional on pa,rticipation. Our conjecture is that correct treatment of reported hours and job-seekers sh.ould result in more stability of preference parameters over time and our intention is to test this hypothesis.
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Appendix A: Data and wage equation . 10 Computed as e~m + wh using observed hours and predicted values for m and w. White (1982, 19832 or Gourieroux and Monfort (1989) for details. Estimates of / and J under H are given by the empirical covariance of the score and by the evaluation of the information matrix at the estimated (restricted) vector of parameters (e~' , e~,)' .
It is convenient to express all these elements using generalised residuals (see Chester and Irish, 1987) . Denoting by' x the regressors, by t the variables used for the variance (homoscedasticity test) and by z the potentially omitted variables, the elements of the score needed are: where h denotes 1/(1 and e(n) the (centered) nth generalized residual. The first two elements appear in s 1 in the notation above, whereas s 2 consists of a selection from the other elements, depending on the precise nature of the test.
The third element will be used in heteroscedasticity tests, the fourth and fifth for skewness and kurtosIs, and the sixth for missing variables. The information matrix can be written in terms of the second moments of the generalized residuals: denoting E ij = E( e (i) e (j») and including all potential elements of the score, we have:
For the probit model, the second element of the score, that corresponding to h, must be discarded, and consequently the last line and last column of J II , as well as the last line of J 12 • For the computation of the generalized residuals and their second moments we must distinguish between the three models. See Chesher and Irish (1987, 41) for details.
(1) Probit: let w = xc, p = <pew) and .f = <pew). Then:
(2) Extended Tobit: let y denote hours worked, d I ' d 2' d 3 denote three dummies corresponding to non-participants, seekers and participants, respectively,let t=hy-w and e=-d l f/(1-p)+cI 2 f/p. Then: 21 e(4) = -w(3 + w 2 )e + d 3 (t4 -3) and the E matrix is given on the next page, after the E matrix for the extended grouped model.
(3) Extended grouped: let d I ' d 2' d 3' d 4' d 5 denote dummies for non participants, part-time, long hours and seekers, respectively, and v denote the vector (-00, 1.5,35.5,41 .5, + 00). Further denote by Z the vector with components Z j = h v j -w . Then:
and using the abbreviations 6x j =x i -x j _ 1 and <l>i= <I>(z;) , <l>i= <I>(z;) , Table C1 shows estimation results for probit models with different assumptions on how the tax system affects the decisions of the households through its impact on the marginal tax rate and on the virtual unearned income: the first one considers the complete tax system, including benefits and social security contributions, the second considers only taxes in a restricted sense, ignoring benefits and contributions, and the third one sets the marginal tax rate to zero and corresponds to a linear budget constraint. Given the comments in subsection 2.1, the differences between the th.ree specifications will lie more in overall differences in marginal wage rates than in the way the latter change over the range of feasible working hours. See also Appendix D.
The model that differs most from the others is the Probit model where taxes are ignored. This leads to much stronger wage and income effects than the other models (see Blomquist, 1988 , for a theoretical investigation of the problems resulting from disregarding the tax system in fabour supply studies). The values reported in Table C2 for corresponding structural coefficients, that is, the coefficients of equation (9), were obtained by setting the scale parameter (J at a value of 33. The value of .70 obtained for the marginal value of time [3 when ignoring taxes is clearly theoretically unacceptable. Of course one could argue that the arbitrary value of (J chosen is not suited to that model. Choosing (J = 1 a , which yields a value of .21 for B, leads to a value of 38.4 for the maximum number of weekly hours available for work to a childless 40 year old woman with no general education degree, which is near to the other results. But note the reversal on the impact of education on labour supply, and the very different estimates for the minimum expenditures, which are scale-invariant. By contrast. considering taxes in the restricted sense only does not lead to dramatic changes in the structural coefficients. Table C3 tells a different story and shows clearly the trade-off between the specification of the marginal tax rate and non-linearity in the preferences: linearity is passed easily for the model with complete treatment of the tax system only. The deterioration of the heteroscedasticity diagnostic for the inverse of the marginal wage reinforces this finding, which is no surprise since that diagnostic picks a special type of non-linearity. Note that a naive application of the Akaike information criterion would have led to prefer the model without tax~s to the others and the model with taxes in restricted sense to the model with the full tax system. 'We hope that we have persuasively documented the danger of that procedure.
24 Table C1 . Results of binary Probit estimation with different treatments of the perception of the tax system. Appendix D: Shape of budget restrictions Figures 01 and 02 show the shape of budget restrictions for taxes in the restricted sense mentioned in Appendix C. The only further non-linearity entailed in the "full tax system" is caused by the ceiling on social security contributions. Figure  01 shows hypothetical budget lines for a household with two children and a capital income of 10 francs per week where the male works 40 hours per week at an hourly wage of30 francs. For an hourly gross wage of 12 francs, the woman remains within the same tax bracket regardless of the number ofweekly hours supplied. She moves through three brackets if she earns 60 francs per hours, and thus belongs to the upper decile of the gross wage distribution. But only for the extreme case of an hourly wage of 120 francs is there a visible departure from linearity. Figure 02 illustrates the impact of the number of children on disposable income through the "quotient familial" mechanism (see Oagsvik et aI., 1988 for details). 
